Short Interest & Thesis
Bottom Line
Short positioning is not the dominant variable in the ALAB setup. Reported FINRA short interest has fallen for four consecutive bi-monthly periods (15.5M → 11.9M shares, settlement Mar 31 → May 29, 2026), borrow is easy (fee ~0.41%, ~2M shares available daily), days to cover is under two on 20-day ADV, and there is no formal short-seller report, activist short campaign, or accounting-allegation file on the name. Shorts covered into a parabolic move (the stock rose from ~$109 to ~$343 across the same four settlement dates) — the de-risking happened on the way up, not at the high, leaving the post-Nasdaq-100 setup with a smaller short-squeeze tailwind than the float-shorted percentage alone would suggest.
Reported Short Interest (M shares, 5/29/26)
% of Float Shorted
Days to Cover (20d ADV)
Borrow Fee Rate
Shares Available to Borrow (M, 6/18/26)
Formal Short-Seller Reports On File
ADV 20d (M shares)
The staged data pipeline returned no FINRA short-interest rows for ALAB in this run (the official FINRA Equity Short Interest source returned empty). Every reported short-interest number on this page is taken from third-party aggregators (MarketBeat, Stocknear, Short Interest Tracker, Fintel) that re-publish NASDAQ/FINRA bi-monthly disclosures. The Nasdaq.com ALAB short-interest page itself currently displays "Data is currently not available." Numbers are reliable to within reporting-period vintage but should be re-verified against the FINRA Equity Short Interest file before sizing decisions.
Reported Short Interest — Down Four Settlements in a Row
Source: bi-monthly NASDAQ/FINRA short-interest as redistributed by MarketBeat and Stocknear. Short interest peaked at 15.50M shares (10.3% of float) on the settlement of Mar 31, 2026 (close $109.60) and has fallen four straight settlements to 11.91M (7.8%) at the May 29 close of $343.05. The institutionally interesting fact: shorts covered into the rally, not at the high. The post-Q1-print squeeze (the stock printed Q1 on May 5 with $308M revenue, +93% YoY, Q2 guide $355–365M) is mostly behind the tape rather than ahead of it.
ALAB has lived in a 6%–10% short-of-float band for its entire life as a public company, with the all-time peak set at late-March 2026 just before the parabolic move. No regime change — normal positioning churn.
Crowding Test — Easy to Cover, Easy to Borrow
Three different days-to-cover bases all point the same direction: the position is not crowded relative to liquidity.
Source: Short Interest Tracker public borrow-availability series, daily polling. Borrow fee has held in a 25–42 bps band since the late-April peak in shares short — a general-collateral / easy-to-borrow range, not hard-to-borrow. Available supply has compressed from ~3M shares in mid-May to ~2M today, consistent with shares being lent out and partially returned as positions covered; no locate-friction language is appearing in the redistributed tape.
Easy-to-borrow, low days-to-cover, falling short interest — the "forced cover into a squeeze" mechanic is not in evidence at current prices. Any squeeze that was available appears to have run between the March 31 and May 29 settlements.
Peer Short-Interest Context
Source: MarketBeat "compare to competitors" panel as of June 18, 2026 (industry: "electronic equipment"). ALAB is shorted roughly in line with CRDO — the only direct silicon peer in the list — and well below LITE, the single name in the cohort that meets a "crowded short" definition. No peer-relative anomaly suggests ALAB is being singled out.
Short Thesis Ledger — What Is Actually On Public Record
The institutional question is whether a credible, documented short thesis exists that could re-rate the stock if it caught attention. The current public record is sparse and low-quality.
No formal short thesis is in market. What exists is a real, debated valuation argument (282x trailing P/E, 67x P/S, 41% above mean analyst target) and the structural concerns flagged in the forensic file — single-customer concentration (~70% of FY2025 revenue), the Amazon-warrant contra-revenue that compresses reported gross margins by ~200 bps starting Q2 FY26, and the FY25 10-K being the first year of full SOX 404(b) auditor attestation. None of these are short-seller-report material today, but they are exactly the surface area a credible publisher would attack.
Off-Exchange Short-Sale Volume — Flow Context Only
Daily trading flow marked as short sale, not outstanding short interest. Reported here because it is the one short-related data point Fintel publishes between FINRA bi-monthly prints.
Source: FINRA off-exchange short-sale volume tape (including dark-pool volume), as redistributed by Fintel. A 38% off-exchange short-volume ratio is not unusual for a NASDAQ-listed semi with deep institutional liquidity; it does not indicate accumulation of a new short position. The staged short-sale-volume artifact (data/short_interest/short_sale_volume.json) returned no rows in this run, so this single data point is the only flow color available.
Do not treat daily short-sale volume as a substitute for reported short interest. They measure different things — volume is execution flow per session, short interest is the outstanding position carried across sessions.
Market Setup — Index Inclusion vs Positioning
Two near-term events change the positioning calculus over the next 30 days, independent of short-thesis quality:
The Nasdaq-100 inclusion (effective Monday June 22, 2026) is the structurally significant near-term flow event. The fact that short interest fell through the May 29 settlement is consistent with a chunk of the index-rebalance front-running being funded out of short covers rather than fresh long demand. The pre-event "easy short" trade appears to have been done. The open question post-event: do indexer buying programs finish before any thesis-driven shorts reload.
Evidence Quality — What Is Official, What Is Inferred
What Would Change This View
A formal short-seller report would change everything. The current "no report on file" status is the single most important fact on this page — a piece from Hindenburg, Spruce Point, Kerrisdale, or a comparable publisher focused on the Amazon warrant economics, the customer concentration, the IT general controls history, or the non-GAAP-to-GAAP gap would materially shift the positioning setup.
A borrow-fee step-up above 100 bps with shares-available collapsing below 1M would signal that informed short sellers are accumulating in size and that locate friction is starting to bite. Neither is present today.
An adverse FY26 10-K auditor attestation, or a new material-weakness disclosure tied to the new ERP rollout, would give a short thesis the forensic anchor it currently lacks. The FY25 10-K's clean PwC attestation is the institutional baseline; that baseline can move.
An unexpected loss of the >70% customer, or a Q2 FY26 print where Amazon-warrant contra-revenue lands materially above the guided ~200 bps without an offsetting volume beat, would shift the short surface from "valuation" to "operational" — a more durable and easier-to-publicize attack surface.
The opposite signal — short interest falling through 6% of float on a print where 1Q26-style volume growth holds or accelerates — would indicate the remaining short base has shrunk to a size that is not decision-useful from a positioning perspective.
Net. Short positioning is not what is driving ALAB today, and short-thesis risk is currently a tail rather than a base case. The decision-useful read for a PM: do not size for a short squeeze, do not size for a short attack, and track the borrow-fee and Q2 FY26 gross-margin lines as the two early-warning gauges that this picture is changing.